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In 2012, Britain finished third in the Olympic medal table, winning twenty-nine golds, a performance 
unmatched since 1908. This success was partly attributed to the employment of elite coaches, signalling a 
shift in attitudes in Britain where coaching had been a substantially under-resourced area of the sporting 
landscape for over a century. This presentation explores the status of British coaching on the eve of the First 
World War through the lens of the coaching debate that followed the 1912 Stockholm Olympics, which 
epitomized the tensions between amateur idealists resistant to change and their more pragmatic colleagues 
who wanted to be more competitive.  
 
The amateur ethos, coaching, and training 
The Edwardian middle classes operated within a status hierarchy, at the pinnacle of which stood a public-
school-educated professional class that distinguished itself through communal markers such as sport and its 
associated philosophy of amateurism. Antagonism towards commercialized sport encompassed an 
antipathy to paid coaches, reinforced by a contempt for specialization. The gentleman amateur was a gifted 
‘all-rounder’ who played several games well with apparent ease while avoiding coaching, which 
undermined elegance of style, and intensive training. Gentleman amateurs also believed that lower-class 
trainers could not properly shape superior upper-class bodies, nor would they be able to understand the 
aesthetics of the style vital to rowing in a crew. The realities of elite sport, however, meant that amateur 
ideals were not always adhered to. After Edmund Warre urged a ban on foreign crews at Henley, Frank 
Lowe, captain of London Rowing Club, argued that if foreign crews were barred because they trained more 
rigorously than the universities then the universities should be excluded because they trained much more 
than metropolitan clubs and so were 'more nearly allied to the professional.’1 What legislators overlooked 
was that the symbolic capital and feelings of personal satisfaction that some athletes received from winning 
persuaded them to seek professional advice. As a result, men like Spencer Wisdom were able to sustain 
coaching careers, especially as international opportunities proliferated before 1914.  
 
American coaching and British reaction 
Like their British counterparts, Americans defined an amateur as one who had never ‘taught, pursued, or 
assisted at athletic exercises for money’,2 although professional coaches were routinely employed, especially 
in the colleges. This resulted in a highly methodical, coach-centred model emphasizing excellence and 
winning by adopting industrialized approaches to team organization.3 Outside the colleges, clubs recruited 
top coaches such as Michael Murphy, who trained the 1900, 1908, and 1912 Olympic teams,4 men who were 
respected and remunerated in a way that led to considerable criticism in Britain. British oarsmen were 
suspicious of the control afforded to the professional coach, ‘to whom the impulse is to take advantage of 
everything’, while athletic administrators objected to organizations subsidizing selected performers and 
providing them with professional coaching, a system ‘radically vicious, and more likely to kill than to foster 
the genuine spirit of sport’.5 The Daily Mail highlighted the ‘human training stables’ in which trainers like 
Murphy employed a ‘scientific process and professional bullying’ while The Times  supported a British 
approach which did not force athletes to specialize or put them under a 'paid professor of the dynamics of 
the human body’.6 
 
Coaching and the Olympics 
In 1908, Britons ‘learnt that in speed and strength we are far behind the Americans’ although amateurs 
remained sanguine, 
 
Business-like methods may sometimes have results which, from our British and possibly insular point 
of view, have a tendency to spoil the game. After giving all due honour to the magnificent 
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performances of the Americans...we have contrived to exhibit a very respectable degree of excellence, 
and so we shall not go far wrong, in the cause of true sport, if we stick to our antiquated methods.7 
 
It was late 1911 before any coaching initiatives emerged, firstly through the formation of an Athletes’ 
Advisory Club, composed mostly of Oxbridge graduates, to supply amateur coaches, since a gentleman 
athlete could only be ‘properly coached by a man who was also a gentleman’.8 A second development was 
the AAA's appointment as chief athletic advisor of F.W. Parker, who accompanied the team to Stockholm 
along with journalist Sam Mussabini, an athletics coach, Harcourt Gold, who had coached the winning crew 
in 1908, and eleven professional trainers.9 An official system of counting points resulted in America heading 
the table, followed by Sweden, guided by Ernest Hjertberg, who had been coaching in America.10 Britain 
placed third, leading amateur coach F.A.M. Webster to express a ‘feeling of shame that we should fall so low 
as to be beaten by even the lesser European nations, who for generations past have been our pupils in all 
sporting pastimes.’11 The Times observed,  
 
Our representation at Stockholm was deplorable, not because we do not possess abundance of first-
class material, but because the arrangements made for...the training and the preparation for our 
athletes, and the care taken of them at Stockholm were almost pathetically farcical.12  
 
For one Spectator correspondent, 'the failure was due to bad training, bad organization, and want of spirit...If 
men are representing their nation they should at least attempt to win...it is bad advertising...for a nation to 
send into the Stadium...a large group of men unprepared to do the nation honour'. Across the Atlantic, 
Harper's Weekly reported that British complacency had received a 'rude jolt'.13 Moss compared pitting the 
British athletes with the Americans as putting ‘an army of untrained men armed with pikes into the field 
with a well-drilled force with every modern scientific implement’.14 
 
The coaching debate 
The ‘tale of national disaster’ at Stockholm,15 engendered a public debate about coaching. An anti-coaching 
rhetoric was evident in objections to the coaching and training practices of other countries, particularly of the 
Americans, whose system of specialization was condemned as ‘a reducto ad absurdum’ of the meaning of 
sport. Although Britain had taught the world to play games for fun, 'other nations now made it a business', 
and state sponsored programmes were emerging in Europe where different sporting histories and social 
contexts resulted in the widespread adoption of the American model.16 Austria engaged American coach 
Alexander Copland, Germany appointed four national athletics coaches, headed by Alvin Kraenzlein, 
formerly coach of Princeton University and four times Olympic champion, while France established long-
term training camps under coach George Hébert.17 The publication of the British Olympic Council (BOC) 
Aims and Objects of the Olympic Games Fund in 1913, further fuelled the debate by asking NGBs to prepare 
schemes for ‘the systematic preparation and training’ of their available talent (Table 1). The BOC then 
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launched an appeal for £100,000 but the public were unresponsive and in January 1914 the appeal was 
closed, leaving only £3,850 to be distributed for training purposes.18  
 
These initiatives resulted in a polarisation of amateur opinion. Some NGBs responded positively. The ASA 
strategy involved the engagement of seven professional instructors for twenty-five weeks, while the AAA 
proposed a national network of training sites, staffed by official trainers. In January 1914, they appointed 
Walter Knox, a professional who had acted as the 1912 Canadian Olympic coach, as national coach and plans 
were put in place for a network of supplementary trainers.19 By contrast, the ARA declined to be associated 
with the Olympic fund, arguing that oarsmen lost their amateur status if their expenses were paid by funds 
raised outside of their own clubs. One Times correspondent countered that, while some believed that giving 
professional coaching to an amateur turned him into a professional, everyone outside the ‘charmed circle of 
the public school’ should have similar opportunities.20 For rowing coach Rudolf Lehmann, however, ‘the 
scheme...means specialisation’ and achieving success this way would make ‘professional slaves’ of the 
athletes. In defence of the proposals, it was pointed out that Britain would compete in Berlin and that it 
needed to be decided if, ‘the British contingent is to consist of a keen but inglorious mob, or of a properly 
selected, properly trained team which will...do credit to the country.’ The Southport Physical Training 
College principal argued that Britain had too much responsibility to ‘throw up the sponge’ so a National 
Olympic Society should be formed to find suitable physical material and train it.21 
 
Much of the argument against professional coaching was directed against suggestions that Britain would 
benefit from adopting American methods. Within the Athletes' Advisory Club some argued for importing an 
American trainer while others believed that English training methods would be just as successful, ‘provided 
men were willing to submit to them’.22 The Daily Mail added fuel to the fire by noting that university 
hammer throwers had improved by thirty feet after a little instruction from the Americans. With the right 
training and coaching, similar improvements could be achieved in other events. This drew a vitriolic 
response from 'Outspoken' in the Daily Express, who found it unbelievable that England, the home of 
athletics, the nursery ground of track and field sports, would take the 'degrading step' of employing an 
American college trainer for £2,000. This was,  
 
...an insult to our own good men; a craven acknowledgement of weak-kneed legislators; a menace to 
our chances of again rising to our proper place; and a playing into the hands of our keenest (and I can 
safely say, not too scrupulous) opponents. 
 
Although many ‘professional masters of the art of training’ had disappeared after being excluded by the 
AAA, Sam Wisdom, 'Cabbage' Perry, and Harry Ransom were among those still operating. Sadly, the AAA 
would never condescend to engage these experts in the ‘trainer's art’, even though most would be willing to 
work for out-of-pocket expenses and be happy to be paid bonuses for developing champions and 
international athletes. These men should be supervised by chief coaches, such as Charles Rammage, a 
'scientist in everything relating to sprinting', who would form a professional advisory committee for the 
AAA, the BOC, and the 'Varsities. Their combined fees would amount to little more than one-half of the 
£2,000 suggested for the college trainer. Additional sectional trainers should be selected by an independent 
committee, rather than being left to ‘amenable but innocent-members of the AAA and BOC’. The author 
concluded that if, 
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Varsity people want an American trainer so very badly, they are rich enough to have one on their own 
account. Let them try him by all means - and note results if they come up against the English-trained 
men, if the right trainers - as is so seldom the case in this unfortunate country - get the job. 23 
 
Many others resisted the ‘outcry for the importation of American coaches and trainers for the purpose of 
teaching us what we had originally taught them’. Concerns were expressed that a horde of Americanized 
trainers, employing their purely empiric craft, ‘based upon a smattering of physiology and a vast self-
assurance, will march onward through many failures to some rare success‘. Another foresaw ‘an army of 
professional coaches’ over-running the country’,24 and there were dire warnings about adopting an 
American model,  
  
Americans are obsessed with pot-hunting. Runners are set upon by paid coaches so that while they 
were still plastic they could learn the machine-like characteristic of American champions and of those 
of no other country. They become semi-professionals who cheat just as they did in Stockholm. 
American athletics keep the athlete from being a good all-round man and he has all the defects of a 
premature specialist. We should be thankful that the recent appeal for the formalising and perfecting 
of our athletics on the American model fell on deaf ears.25 
 
The Aftermath 
In many respects, the elite British amateur sportsman was faced with a difficult dilemma if he wanted to be 
competitive before the First World War. Amateurism implied that winning needed to be kept in perspective 
but the coaching debate suggests that more attention needs to be paid to the fluid nature of Edwardian 
amateurism because this philosophy was interpreted differently according to social class, playing status, or 
local traditions. Most countries were less class based and much more flexible about how amateur values 
should be interpreted than Britain. In America, amateurism was rapidly modified in a society which rejected 
class theories based on hereditable attributes and the result was a highly systematic coach-centred model,26 
which brought consistent international success. While there was a grudging acceptance in Britain that 
Olympic success increasingly required a commitment to coaching and training, amateur unease with this 
approach was reflected in the master-servant relationship imposed on professionals in contrast to the coach-
centred system adopted in America. Actually, it seems that for some critics it was not the idea of training 
and coaching that remained an issue but the prospect of engaging too closely with American methods, 
which undermined the amateur values inherent to British sport. This reluctance to grant a controlling role to 
professional coaches was connected not only to the amateur ideology but also to a broader nationalism, 
especially when it became clear that the American paradigm was being adopted elsehwere.  
 
There were signs before 1914 that the amateur hegemony could become more pliable when placed under 
pressure and that the combination of poor performances in Stockholm with increasing concerns over 
national decadence generated a willingness to consider more pragmatic approaches to coaching and 
training. However, any potential legacy was short-lived, partly due to the outbreak of hostilities in July 1914, 
which, coupled with the general indifference of the British public, meant that the strategies proposed by 
those involved with the BOC, AAA, and the ASA, were not revived after 1918. Debates over coaching 
subsided and amateur administrators, many of whom felt that Britain had little to learn from foreigners and 
continued to believe in the natural superiority of the British sportsman, reverted to type. They became 
defensive over their failure to compete effectively and reacted by insisting that they were more interested in 
playing fairly than winning and by placing even more emphasis on the place of the volunteer, as 
administrator and coach. 
 
There are a number of possible reasons for this. Although the individuals associated with the BOC report 
were challenging the status quo, the barriers of amateurism remained strong. Altering years of tradition 
would require a change in mind set and this had not been fully achieved in 1914. These men were invariably 
Oxbridge graduates and students, many of whom had enlisted in the Officer Training Corps, and the 
evidence suggests that mortality within this group in the Great War was much higher, percentage wise, than 
in the other ranks. The deaths of this ‘Lost Generation’, thousands of educated and wealthy individuals who 
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could potentially have become the nation’s sporting leaders, significantly affected moves for reform.27 There 
is also a hint within the post-Stockholm coaching debate, and indeed in the discourse before the Games, that 
there had been something of an 'us' and 'them' confrontation between some university men and amateurs 
from other sections of society who were inclined to take different attitudes to their sport. It seems possible, 
therefore, that the coaching argument subsided somewhat after the War because this privileged class was 
replaced with men who had not shared their perspectives on sport in the immediate pre-War period. 
Huggins and Williams have also highlighted a degree of ‘conservatism in sport.’ The experiences and loss of 
war caused many individuals to view the pre-War era as a time of security and reason and this may explain 
a nostalgic desire to return to a world that supposedly existed before 1914.28 The wider community, for the 
most part, had been generally ignorant of the debates surrounding coaching schemes and had other things 
on their mind at that point so, for the majority, it was natural to desire a return to the traditional values of 
sport in which amateurism continued to provide a philosophical direction. It might also be worth 
considering the broader relationship between Britain and America in the immediate post-War period and 
what affect that might have had on coaching perspectives in both countries. 
 
While the War undoubtedly had a major impact, the virulence of the debate surrounding coaching proposals 
in 1913 and 1914 suggests that these initiatives were never going to remain uncontested. For the rest of the 
twentieth century, amateur values continued to take precedence over any residual coaching legacy left by 
the post-Stockholm initiatives, demonstrating just how fragile those initiatives had been and emphasising 
the power of resistance inherent among those who adhered to traditional perspectives. Although the 1936 
BOA report conceded that devoting more time to specialist training would improve standards it also queried 
whether this would ‘demonstrate anything of national importance’ while, in 1938, Bevil Rudd praised the 
work of amateur coaches who ‘nobly tackled the spade-work that an army of paid coaches undertake in 
America and on the Continent’.29 Seventy years later, this legacy of voluntarism and amateurism remained a 
pervasive influence in Britain where three-quarters of the estimated total of 1,109,000 coaches surveyed in 
2004 and 2007 were unpaid volunteers.30  
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